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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-3160
________________
KEVIN RUTLEDGE,
Appellant
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
_______________________________________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civ. No. 05-cv-00196)
District Judge: Honorable James M. Munley
_______________________________________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
January 5, 2006
Before: BARRY, STAPLETON AND GREENBERG, CIRCUIT JUDGES
(Filed: January 12, 2006)
_______________________
OPINION
_______________________
PER CURIAM
Kevin Rutledge appeals from the District Court’s order denying his habeas corpus
petition filed under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. In his habeas petition, Rutledge challenges the loss
of good conduct time (GCT) and other sanctions imposed while in federal custody at the

Federal Correctional Institution in Fort Dix, New Jersey. For the following reasons, we
will affirm the District Court’s order.
While incarcerated at FCI Fort Dix, Rutledge was issued an incident report
charging him with abuse of the telephone, possession of anything unauthorized, and
conduct that disrupts the running of the institution. The charges were based on the
discovery of a cell phone which a friend of Rutledge’s brought him on a visit to FCI Fort
Dix. At a hearing before a Discipline Hearing Officer (DHO), Rutledge admitted that the
cell phone was his, that his friend had brought it to him, and that he had used the phone
while in custody. Based on Rutledge’s admissions, the DHO found that Rutledge had
committed two infractions: (1) non-criminal telephone abuse in violation of Code 297;
and (2) possession of anything unauthorized in violation of Code 305. The DHO imposed
sanctions including forfeiture and disallowance of GCT, disciplinary segregation, and a
one-year loss of telephone privileges and visitation privileges.
Rutledge challenged the DHO’s decision by filing a habeas corpus petition in the
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.1 Rutledge concedes
that he violated Code 305 by possessing an unauthorized cell phone, but he contests the
DHO’s determination that he abused the telephone in violation of Code 297. Rutledge
also challenges the severity of the sanctions imposed. The District Court interpreted
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By the time he filed his habeas petition, Rutledge had been transferred to the Low
Security Correctional Institution (LSCI) Allenwood, which is within the judicial district
of the Middle District of Pennsylvania.
2

Rutledge’s challenge to the Code 297 violation as a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence, found evidence to support the DHO’s conclusion, ruled that the sanctions
imposed were permissible, and denied Rutledge’s habeas petition. Rutledge appeals.2
We consider first Rutledge’s challenge to the DHO’s decision on the Code 297
infraction. Code 297 prohibits “[u]se of the telephone for abuses other than criminal
activity (e.g., circumventing telephone monitoring procedures, possession and/or use of
another inmate’s PIN number; third-party calling; third-party billing; using credit card
numbers to place telephone calls, conference calling; talking in code).” 28 C.F.R.
§ 541.13, Table 3. Rutledge argues that this prohibition applies only to telephones
installed in the institution, not to cell phones. The District Court concluded that using an
unauthorized cell phone circumvents telephone monitoring procedures and rejected this
argument. We agree fully with the District Court’s logical conclusion that using a cell
phone circumvents telephone monitoring procedures. We also agree that the evidence
amply supports the DHO’s conclusion that Rutledge violated Code 297 – Rutledge
admitted that the cell phone was his and that he had used it while in custody.
We consider next Rutledge’s challenge to the severity of the sanctions imposed.
Regarding the Code 297 infraction, the applicable regulation permits forfeiture of up to
60 days GCT and disallowance of up to 27 GCT for the year, the precise sanction the
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We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and 2253(a). We exercise
plenary review over the District Court’s legal conclusions and apply a clearly erroneous
standard to its findings of fact. See Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 126 (3d Cir. 2002).
3

DHO imposed on Rutledge. See 28 C.F.R. § 541.13, Table 3. For his Code 305
infraction, Rutledge forfeited 13 days GCT and was disallowed 13 days GCT, also within
the limits prescribed by the regulation. See id. To the extent Rutledge complains about
the loss of visitation privileges, the regulations permit the loss of privileges. See id.
Moreover, the loss of visitation privileges is especially appropriate where, as here, an
inmate obtains an unauthorized cell phone from a visitor.
Finally, Rutledge argues that imposing sanctions under both Code 305 and Code
297 violates the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Government asks that we decline to
consider Rutledge’s double jeopardy argument because he raises it for the first time on
appeal. Rutledge acknowledges that he did not raise a double jeopardy claim in the
District Court. Under the circumstances presented here, we see no reason to depart from
our general rule of not considering an issue raised for the first time on appeal. See Gass
v. Virgin Islands Tel. Corp., 311 F.3d 237, 246-47 (3d Cir. 2002). Accordingly, we
decline to consider Rutledge’s double jeopardy argument.
For these reasons, we are convinced that the District Court properly denied
Rutledge’s habeas corpus petition. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s
judgment.

4

